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Policy, saving rates, human capital, etc. are possible explanations for poor economic performance, but 
while these factors are changeable, underdevelopment persists. Looking for an unchangeable factor, we 
construct a theory for the effect of values, such as moral values, risk-taking, and responsibility to others, on 
economic performance, and demonstrate it using a model in which responsibility for parents prevents 
development. We construct data of economic performance and values of seven tribes in Kenya by inferring 
values from children's stories, and verify the model. Thus, we open a door for the quantitative analysis of 
the effect of values over the economy. 
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I. Introduction 
  Human capital (education and health), government share of the output, 
macroeconomic stability, investment share, openness to trade, rule of law, religion, 
geography (such as distance from the equator), and many other variables have been 
suggested as an explanation for differences in standards of living, output and economic 
growth (see, for example, Barro, 1991, Sala-i-Martin, 1997, and Eicher, Papageorgiou 
and Roehn, 2007).
1  
  However, almost all these factors, besides geography, are man-made. Policy, 
educational decisions, investment, etc., are all decisions of the inhabitants of a given 
country. Geography is indeed an exception, but (1) it explains little of the differences 
between countries, and more important (2) institutions trump the effect of geography and 
trade (Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004). Institutions, which influence the way 
decisions are made, are affected by their historical origin (Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson, 2000). However, even though the origin matters, the people living in a given 
country or other relevant unit change the institutions over time (North, 1990). Therefore, 
the people are responsible for the variables explaining differences between countries, and 
we need to focus on the differences between people. Since it is hard to believe that 
physical differences explain variation in economic performance between groups, and 
differences in intelligence should have been captured in the education variables 
mentioned above (yet, many education variables are often found insignificant, and some 
are even found to be negative; see for example Eicher, Papageorgiou and Roehn, 2007), 
                                                  
1 Levine and Renelt (1992) consider most of these variables to be fragile, but the vast majority of the 
literature claims that many of these variables can explain some of the differences between countries.  
we are left with differences in values, such as attitude to hard work, entrepreneurship, 
collaboration, risk-taking, altruism, integrity, caring for others, law-abiding, just reward 
and morality. Accordingly, our main goal in this paper is to investigate whether different 
values of different groups may lead to differences in economic performance of these 
groups. 
  The macroeconomic literature treated very few values, and most of the discussion 
regarding values was very general (see Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2006, for a 
literature survey). Religion has been considered in the literature (starting with the 
influential work of Max Weber), but since religion comprises a cluster of values, it does 
not allow the isolation of the effect of any particular value. Risk avoidance received 
substantial attention in the microeconomic literature, but macroeconomic growth 
literature widely ignores it by assuming risk-neutrality, or identical risk avoidance among 
agents. Greif (1994) addresses the role of cultural beliefs (expectations) in equilibrium, 
but not the role of the values and norms. Akerlof (2007) motivates this discussion by 
demonstrating a possible effect of behavioral norms on the macroeconomic outcome, but 
without any methodology for an empirical analysis. Trust is the only value that gained 
significant footing in the macroeconomic literature, using either ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization (assuming that fractionalized countries enjoy less trust) or a specific 
question regarding trust from the World Values Survey.
2 Zak and Knack (2001) presents 
a theory showing that trust is required in order to lower costs of investment and thus 
increase economic performance, and use both the WVS and fractionalization for 
supporting empirical analysis (see also Knack and Keefer, 1997, and Guiso, Sapienza and 
                                                  
2 World Values Survey, the European Values Study Foundation and World Values Survey Association, 
2006.  
Zingales, 2004). A major problem with the usage of values is measurement, and the 
WVS, administering questionnaires directly asking people about some values, is no 
exception. The WVS did not address many values that potentially affect economic 
performance, and the examined values suffer from a measurement problem, due to the 
hesitancy of interviewees to identify their own perceived negative values.
3  
  This research uses a novel methodology for the measurement of values, 
identifying the values from popular children's stories. Stories are long known to reflect 
the values of the society (Johns-Heine and Gerth, 1949, and Albrecht, 1956), and some 
claim that stories educate children, affect their moral development, and shape their values 
and the society's values (Vitz, 1990, and Hakemulder, 2000). Relying on either one of 
these two characteristics, this study uses stories collected through questionnaires to 
identify the values within a society in a manner that is comparable across societies. The 
use of stories allows us to overcome the measurement problems in surveys of values 
mentioned above, and allows for solving the endogeneity problem, i.e., the concern that 
values might be affected by economic performance, since the values are based on stories 
that chronologically precede the economic performance (see Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingales, 2006, for a description of the problem). 
  We first present an abstract theory for the effect of values over economic 
performance. This theory illustrates the potential effects of various values on existing 
macroeconomic models, and thus on economic performance. We then construct a general 
equilibrium model demonstrating the aforementioned general theory, with the effect of a 
                                                  
3 Hofstede (2001) focused on work related values, but suffered from similar problems, and did not gain any 
influence in the macroeconomic literature. Some of the anthropology literature deals with some values of 
one or few societies, but this literature does not allow for comparison among a large sample of groups, and 
thus does not allow for any empirical analysis.  
specific value that was not addressed in the economic literature so far, responsibility and 
care for one's parents (physical and financial), on the economic performance of a country 
or society. We show that when a country is underdeveloped, high merit placed on care 
may inhibit or prevent its development, but when a country is developed, this value has 
no effect. Thus, we show the importance of values for understanding the lack of 
development. 
  We later use our novel methodology for measurement of values to identify several 
values within the seven major tribes in Kenya. Tribes in Kenya share the same colonial 
history, similar geographic conditions, the same government and many other similar 
factors, thus making them a good test case for the theory. We used questionnaires to 
identify the popular children's stories in each tribe, analyzed the values each story 
supports and aggregated the results over the stories of each tribe. We find an extremely 
low level of trust for all the tribes (consistent with the ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
measurement mentioned above), and differences between the tribes in their responsibility 
to other group members, attitude to hard work, risk taking, collaboration and law 
obedience. We compare our results to the description of five of the seven tribes from 
Berg-Schlosser (1984) and find no contradictions.  
  The Kenyan National Bureau of Statistics does not publish data that allows for 
direct identification of the economic performance of each tribe, but does publish data by 
district (Statistical Abstract, Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2007). We used this 
data, combined with the 1999 population census (from Minnesota Population Center, 
2007), relying on the geographical segregation of the tribes, to characterize the economic 
performance of the tribes. We found significant differences in a range of variables, and  
showed the negative and significant effects of responsibility for other group members on 
the relevant variables, thus supporting our theory.   
  This study thus contributes to the literature in several aspects: (1) It provides a 
general theory for the effect of values, and a theory for the effect of a specific value, 
responsibility and care for others, on economic performance. (2) It provides a possible 
explanation for the failure of many development policies (see Easterly, 2007) that were 
based on the effect of factors such as human capital, openness to trade, and savings rate, 
while ignoring the effect of values. (3) It supplies a unique methodology for the 
measurement of values. (4) It characterizes economic performance and values of seven 
major tribes in Kenya.  
  We acknowledge some limitations of the present study: (1) The economic 
performance of various tribes is based on geographical segregation, which is not 
complete and decreases over time; and (2) having only seven tribes (i.e., seven data-
points) precludes convincing empirical proof of the hypothesized effect of values on 
economic performance based on the proposed theory. However, we do believe that we 
have managed to provide support for the theory. We hope to be able to conduct a broader 
analysis for a large sample of countries, and to use the values from such an analysis in 
cross-country growth regressions, thus identifying which values affect economic 
performance, and through which channels. 
  The paper proceeds as follows: Section II presents a general theory for the effect 
of values. Section III demonstrates the effect of a specific value using a general 
equilibrium dynamic model. Section IV presents the data and empirical analysis. Section 
V concludes.   
II. A  General  Theory  
  Most of the growth models (and some other macroeconomic models) can be 
written in the following general form: 
 (1)  ) , , ( t t t t E D K f Y = , 
where  Y notes the output of a given country, K represents the state variables at the 
beginning of period t (such as the stock of capital, current technology, etc.), D represents 
the decisions of the various agents (such as the allocation of time between production and 
other activities), and E is the set of exogenous variables (such as trade policy of other 
countries). The state variables of the next period are affected by the decisions: 
 (2)  ) , , ( 1 t t t t E D K g K = + , 
and the decisions themselves are a function of the other variables, usually as a result of 
some utility maximization: 
 (3)  ) , ( t t t E K h D = . 
Combining (3) and (1) yields, therefore,  ) , (
~
) ), , ( , ( t t t t t t t E K f E E K h K f Y = = . Using 
(3), and given E of every period, one can get the evolution of the output over time.  
  For the Solow (1956) model, for example, the state variables are capital, size of 
the population, and current technology. The exogenous variables may include TFP 
growth rate, and the decisions of (3) are simply the constant saving rate of the economy 
and the constant population growth rate. Endogenous growth models (see Grossman and 
Helpman, 1991, for example) may include capital and knowledge (the current set of 
blueprints or goods) as state variables, decisions regarding time allocation between 
research and production, and output allocation between savings and consumption as  
equation (3), and capital, knowledge and production of trading partners as exogenous 
variables. The same model can apply to regions, ethnic groups, etc. 
  Our main argument deals with the decision function and its exogenous variables. 
Decisions of individuals are a function of values (and combinations of values), as well as 
the current state and exogenous factors. The effect of risk-tolerance on decisions of 
individuals, for example, has long been analyzed in the microeconomic literature. One 
can claim that values are embedded within h, the function itself, such that every country 
would have a different h. However, this does not allow comparison between countries, 
since comparing assumes h is the same. The convergence literature (see, for example, de 
la Fuente, 1997) would be a good example. Therefore, (3) should actually be rewritten as: 
 (4)    ) , , ( t t t t E M K h D = ,  
where  M is the set of values of the population. Risk tolerance is widely ignored in 
macroeconomic models and in cross-country regressions, usually by implicitly assuming 
risk neutrality. Including it in a decision to become an entrepreneur in endogenous 
growth models (see Grossman and Helpman, 1991) would decrease the magnitude of 
entrepreneurial activity if the population were risk-averse. On the other hand, if 
entrepreneurship is a value by itself, i.e., the utility of an individual increases from being 
an entrepreneur (all else equal), the amount of this activity would increase. Belief in just 
reward may cause people to respect property rights of others, thus serving as a 
replacement for lack of enforcement of property rights and increasing investment and 
economic performance. As mentioned in the introduction, the only value that gained 
extensive ground in that literature is trust, which may affect investment decisions and the 
cost of transactions, thus affecting economic performance.   
  We claim that a wide set of values is embedded in M, affecting these decisions. 
The next section constructs a simple model showing that responsibility and care for other 
group members, especially for parents, can have a significant effect over economic 
performance.  
 
III.  Group Responsibility – Caring for One's Parents 
  Responsibility and care for others is regarded as a virtue, and may indeed increase 
the welfare of both the caregiver and the recipient. However, in some cases, it may also 
restrict the set of opportunities an individual can exploit, thus hurting economic 
performance. In this study, we address responsibility and care for one's parents, which 
can take the form of physical care and support, or a form of financial support that 
replaces physical support. In a less developed economy, in which the urban wage is not 
high enough to allow for financially supporting others (consider early stages of 
development), physical care for one's parents forces the individual to stay near them, in a 
rural area. Thus, this individual is not exposed to any employment opportunities in an 
industrialized-advanced sector, but rather only in the traditional sector. If the individual 
regards responsibility and care as a value, staying in the rural area increases the utility 
due to living by this value, and compensates for the loss of a somewhat higher urban 
wage. If this were the case for the entire population, the industrialized sector would face 
difficulties in growing and increasing its productivity. If its productivity remains low, it is 
unable to attract workers, thus creating a trap. On the other hand, if there exists a 
developed industrial sector, with high productivity and high wages, an individual may 
elect employment in that sector, substituting the physical care for one's parents with  
financial support while still living by the same value. This substitution is not possible if 
the wage in that sector is not high enough. We proceed by formally modeling this 
mechanism. 
A.  The Basic Model 
  Assume an economy with two sectors: (1) traditional, which pays a wage of w, 
has a constant marginal productivity which equals the wage, and is located throughout the 
rural area, and (2) industrial sector which pays a wage of  w w w ≥ ,  and is located in an 
urban area. For simplicity, we assume that no capital is required for production and 
constant marginal productivity (or a competitive market), such that there are no profits 
and the entire output is paid as wages. We describe the evolvement of the productivity of 
the industrial sector over time under subsection III.C. Individuals cannot borrow or lend. 
We also assume that the relative price of the industrial output and traditional output is 
constant and normalized to 1; one may think of internationally traded goods as the reason 
for the constant relative price. 
  An individual born in the rural area chooses whether to stay near parents and 
work in the traditional sector, or move to an urban area and work in the industrial sector 
(away from parents). We assume that the utility function of a representative agent is: 
 (5)  ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , , ( w Z d S w V w d U α α α + − = , 
where α ,  0 1 ≥ ≥ α  represents the degree of importance of responsibility and care for 
one's parents, and  0 = α  represents no importance at all, d is the physical distance from 
the individual's parents and w is the wage. α  is distributed in the population (with values 
between 0 and 1), we will refer to specific distribution in the following sub-sections. The 
individual has utility from his wage (which allows for consumption), physical presence  
and physical help to one's parents (when residing near by) and financial support. We 
normalize the utility from financial support when the individual earns w to 0, and treat 
only the increase in the utility from financial support when the wage is higher.
4 Thus, the 
utility is comprised of V, a standard utility function; S, a continuous function which 
measures the disutility from residing far from one’s parents and not being able to 
physically support them ( 0 / , 0 ) 0 ( > ∂ ∂ = d S S ); and Z, a continuous function which 
measures the increase in the utility from earning more than the rural area's wage and 
being able to financially support one's parents ( 0 / , 0 ) ( > ∂ ∂ = w Z w Z ).
5, 6 For simplicity, 
we assume that the urban area is far enough from the rural area (and the transportation 
system is not good enough) to make a timely 'commute' to one's parents; thus, migrating 
individuals cannot physically support their parents. Moreover, we assume that once the 
distance is above that threshold and does not allow for physical support, the actual 
distance has no effect on the utility. Accordingly, the distance for a migrating individual 
is a constant, noted with  d d = , compared to  0 = d  for no migration. Thus, the utility 
maximization decision  )} ( ) ( ) ( { w Z d S w V Max
d
α α + −  is simplified and translates into 
)} ( ) ( ) ( ), ( ) 0 ( ) ( { w Z d S w V w Z S w V Max α α α α + − + − , i.e., choosing whether to migrate 
or not.  
 
                                                  
4 Obviously, adding a constant to the utility function representing this baseline utility from financial 
support does not change the nature of the utility function and any of the results. 
5 Since there are no savings V can refer to w instead of to consumption, where Z is the increase in the utility 
from diverting a part of w from consumption to financial support. 
6 Unlike rural-urban migration models, in which the cost of migration is either a constant or a function of 
the distance (see, for example, Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999), the cost here is affected by the value 
and by the interaction between the value and the alternative wage, i.e. the ability to provide financial 
support.    
B. Static  Equilibrium 
  Responsibility and care for one's parents shifts away from the industrial sector 
when the productivity of that sector is low, but not when productivity is high.  
Claim 1: There is a cutoff level of the value (an indifference point; noted with 
* α ) such 
that individuals with a higher value would work in the traditional sector and individuals 
with lower value would work in the industrial sector. This cutoff level increases with the 
wage paid in the industrial sector. 
Proof: From (5), the utility of an individual who does not migrate to an urban area is 
) ( ) ( ) 0 ( ) ( ) , 0 , ( w V w Z S w V w U = + − = α α α . The utility of an individual who migrates is 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) , , ( w Z d S w V w d U α α α + − = . Choosing the industrial sector requires that 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( w Z d S w V w V α α + − < , or  ) ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ( w V w V w Z d S − < − α . Accordingly, for 
every  w  one can calculate a cutoff level of α , such that every individual with 
* α α <  
will migrate and work in the industrial sector, and every individual with 
* α α >  will stay 
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Note that (6) is increasing in w  (and strictly increasing in w  when  0 1
* > > α ), i.e., 
when the wage in the industrial sector is higher, the level of care for parents required to 
prevent someone from migrating is higher.    QED 
  Let us consider two possible distributions of α  in the population (while 
maintaining the assumption that  0 1 ≥ ≥ α ); the first is very general and embodies many 
possible distributions, and the second complies to the analysis of a representative agent.  
  The first case is a distribution which is continuous with a strictly increasing 
cumulative distribution function (i.e., strictly positive density function, such as the 
uniform distribution). In this case, an increase in productivity and wage of the industrial 
sector raises 
* α  and raises the share of population that is employed in the industrial 
sector (strictly raises as long as 
* 1 α > ).  
  The second case is the trivial distribution of one-mass-point density function, i.e., 
all of the population has the same level of the value, noted with α ˆ  (one-point-distribution 
hereinafter). As long as  α α ˆ
* <  the industrial sector does not exist. An increase in the 
wage of that sector increases 
* α . If it increases such that  α α ˆ
* > , the entire population 
shifts to the industrial sector.  
  Let us note with  ) (x P  the portion of the population which has a value of  x ≤ α . 
It is easy to see from the above analysis, by observing  ) (
* α P , that since P is increasing 
in x, and since 
* α  is increasing in w , ) (
* α P  is increasing in w .  
  Let us now compare two countries identical in all parameters except the 
distribution of the responsibility and care value. Define a country with a lower level of 
values as a country that has greater P for every x<1 (i.e., country 1 has a lower level of 
care than country 2 if and only if  ) ( ) ( , 1 2 1 x P x P x > < ∨ ).  
Claim 2: All else equal, a country with a lower level of responsibility and care has a 
larger population share employed in the industrial sector.  
Proof: Easy to see, by substituting x with 
* α , that for every w  and the matching 
* α , a 
country with a lower level of the value has a greater  ) (
* α P  (directly from the definition)  
and therefore a larger share of the population employed in the industrial sector (strictly 
larger share for  0 1
* > >α ).     QED 
  Note that the economy is in general equilibrium: Workers choose their sector, are 
paid their marginal productivity, and the workers and their parents consume their income. 
Since the two goods have relative price of 1, and since the entire output is paid as wages 
(no capital, constant marginal productivity), the economy is in general equilibrium.  
C. Dynamic  Effects 
  The productivity of the industrial sector and the wage this sector pays may 
increase over time, as a result of improvement in technology, learning how to better 
produce, etc., but only if this sector exists. We use the Learning by Doing mechanism 
(first appeared in Arrow (1962) and later, in different versions, in Romer (1986), Young 
(1991), Aharonovitz (2008) and others) and apply a bounded learning mechanism: 
 (7)  ), ( 1 − = t t P A w   






w A . The 
productivity, and therefore the wage paid by the industrial sector, is increasing with past 
employment in this sector, since greater employment in the past allowed for more 
learning experience and improvements in production. However, if the sector did not exist, 
we assume that its productivity is identical to that of the traditional sector or above it.
7 
  Let us first observe the case of one-point-distribution with low productivity of the 
industrial sector when it didn’t exist the period before (where the extreme case is 
w A = ) 0 ( ), but high if the entire population works in that sector. Let us note the wage of 
                                                  
7 This is a bounded mechanism, which does not allow for perpetual growth. One may regard it as a catch-up 
mechanism (where A(1) represents catch-up) with the advanced technology developed elsewhere.  
the industrial sector required to push the population towards that sector with 
*
w  (i.e., 
α α ˆ ) (
* * = w ). 
Claim 3: If the distribution of values in the population is one-point-distribution, 
* ) 0 ( w A < and 
* ) 1 ( w A > , there exists a poverty trap. 
Proof: Let us check the two extreme points. Assume that  0 1 = − t P , i.e., no-one was 
employed in the industrial sector. Accordingly, 
*
1) ( w P A t < − , therefore  α α ˆ )) ( ( 1
* < − t P A , 
and 0 = t P . Note that the inequalities hold for every  1 − t P , which is close enough to 0. 
Therefore, if the share of the population employed in the industrial sector was low 
enough, the share in the following period is 0.  
  Assume now that  1 1 = − t P  (i.e., the entire population was employed in the 
industrial sector). Accordingly, 
*
1) ( w P A t > − , therefore  α α ˆ )) ( ( 1
* > − t P A , and  1 = t P . Note 
that the inequalities hold for every  1 − t P  which is close enough to 1. Therefore, if the share 
of the population employed in the industrial sector is high enough, the entire population 
works in the industrial sector in the following period. The wage and the utility are 
obviously higher than the first case presented ( 0 1 = − t P ), therefore, the first case is a 
poverty trap.
8      QED  
  Notice that, for a given learning function A(), the existence of the trap depends on 
the distribution of the value in the population. If the density mass of value α ˆ  generates P, 
such that the industrial sector required to attract them is low enough (i.e. 
* ) 0 ( w A >  and 
therefore  α α ˆ )) 0 ( (
* > A ), the trap disappears. Therefore, the existence of the trap depends 
                                                  
8 The result resembles the big-push argument (see, for example, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), but 
the increase in productivity here is required in order to overcome a cutoff level of the value rather than in 
order to create a market-size effect.  
on the distribution of the value and, if the responsibility and care value in the population 
is low enough, the trap may not exist. 
 Panel  A of Figure 1 presents the trap. The curved solid line is current industrial 
wage (vertical axis) as a function of past employment in that sector ( 1 − t P , horizontal 
axis). The two solid vertical lines represent  1 − t P  (horizontal axis) as a function of the 
wage at that period,  1 − t w  (the vertical axis, which is used for both past and current wage). 
As long as the wage is below 
* w  no one works in the industrial sector ( 0 1 = − t P ) and, 
accordingly, the wage remains below 
* w . However, if the wage is above 
* w , everyone 
works in the industrial sector, thus causing the wage to stay above 
* w . Therefore, a wage 
below 
* w  is indeed a trap. Panel B presents the case of no trap – the wage of the 
industrial sector is above the cutoff (indifference) wage for every P, thus attracting the 
entire population to the industrial sector. 
Figure 1 here 
  When the distribution of the responsibility and care value in the population is not 
one-point-distribution, one gets  ) (
* α P  which is increasing in w  (see subsection III.B), 
but the exact shape of the function depends on the distribution of that value and the 
functional forms. For some distributions and functional forms one can get poverty traps, 
while for others the result may be multiple equilibria or solely complete industrialization. 
Figure 2 demonstrates this by presenting several possible P functions. While, for the 
lower dashed line, the only equilibrium is complete industrialization (for every P, the 
wage of the industrial sector is higher than the wage required to support this level of P, 
therefore P increases over time), for the upper dashed line the employment is solely in the  
traditional sector. The middle one presents multiple equilibria, stable and unstable. One 
can easily notice that the possible equilibria are a function of the distribution of the value 
and the learning function A.  
Figure 2 here 
  The model presented in this section creates a similar pattern to the one described 
under Section II. The output is a function of current productivity and the individuals’ 
decisions regarding choice of sectors. The productivity is a function of past productivity, 
and the decisions are a function of the productivity and the values (similar to equation 
(4)). A population that is characterized by a high level of the value may tend to decide not 
to migrate, but rather to stay close to the family and work in the traditional sector, thus 
preventing future growth. Thus, the model serves as an example of that general theory. 
The following sections present data supporting this model. 
 
IV.  Data and Empirical Analysis 
  Tribes in Kenya demonstrate differences in values and in their economic 
performance. Since the tribes share the same colonial origin, the same government, and 
many other factors that affect economic performance, they are a good test case for 
analysis of the effect of values on economic performance. We selected therefore the 
seven major tribes in Kenya: Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Kamba, Kalenjin, Kisii, and Meru, 
who represent more than 80% of the population (all tribes that are above 5% of the 
population; Kenya has more than 50 tribes, but each of the other tribes represents 
significantly less than 5%; see Kurian, 1992a). We gathered data on the values and 
economic performance of these tribes and analyzed the link between the two.   
A. Economic  performance 
  The Kenyan government does not publish data on economic performance by 
ethnicity, and omits this variable from the population survey. However, data by 
geographical location (districts) combined with the geographical segregation of the tribes 
allowed for constructing the economic performance indicators of the tribes. We used the 
2007 Statistical Abstract (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2007) and Kenya 1999 
Population and Housing Census (Minnesota Population Center, 2007) to extract data for 
several variables representing economic performance by district. We matched a map of 
the districts (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2007) to maps of the languages and 
tribes in Kenya (Gordon, 2005, served as the baseline map; Kurian, 1992b, was used as 
well) to determine which tribe is the major occupant of which district. For each tribe, we 
constructed economic performance indicators as a weighted average (by population size) 
of these indicators over the districts occupied by that tribe.
9 Table 1 presents the tribes, 
districts occupied by each tribe, and the economic performance variables we selected. 
Table 1 here 
  The economic performance variables chosen include: (1) infant mortality rate 
(representing health conditions); (2) share of the population with at least primary 
education (since education is strongly correlated with higher wages, at least in developed 
countries; see, for example, Becker, 1964); (3) share of households with three or less 
people (allowing for higher investment in human capital); (4) share of employment 
outside the family (representing more non-traditional economic activity); (5) average of 
the share of households with electricity, share of households with piped water, and share 
of households with sewage access (representing modern housing conditions and 
                                                  
9 Districts populated by more than one major tribe were dropped from the sample.  
urbanization, which are associated with economic development); and (6) households' 
share with roof made of tiles, concrete or sheet metal (again, representing better standards 
of living and urbanization, thus development). However, since Kenya is relatively 
underdeveloped, health conditions may be influenced by external aid, thus not always 
representing development. In addition, since the return to human capital is lower in less 
developed places, there are fewer opportunities for taking advantage of better education, 
thus making the second and third variables good indicators for potential future 
development, but not necessarily for current development. External employment in 
Kenya is affected by ownership of land and inheritance rules affecting this ownership, 
which vary by tribe (Berg-Schlosser, 1984). Therefore, our leading variables in the 
analysis are the last two, (5) and (6). These two variables, which are strongly correlated, 
measure current development and therefore should be strongly associated with the 
evolvement of wages and output discussed in section III. It should be noted that the 
income, output per capita or average wage per district (or tribe) would have been better 
variables, but this data is unavailable for many of the districts and for a large share of the 
population in the other districts.  
  Table 1 presents all six indicators. Note the significant differences between the 
tribes and the correlation across some of the indices. The Kikuyu, the tribe with the 
lowest infant mortality rate, also has the highest education, highest share of small 
families (family size), highest external employment, and highest share of modern housing 
conditions. These findings are in line with Berg-Schlosser (1984), reporting that the 
Kikuyu have the highest percentage of non-agricultural employment among all tribes, the 
highest percentage of people with formal education, and a tendency to build modern  
houses. The Meru, with the second lowest mortality rate, also enjoy high shares of 
modern housing conditions.  
  The Luo and the Luhya, with the highest mortality rates, are also below average 
on education, external employment, and modern housing conditions among the seven 
tribes. While Berg-Schlosser (1984) indicates that the Kamba and the Luhya are second 
to the Kikuyu in education, we found them slightly below average. This may be a result 
of Berg-Schlosser (1984) not reporting findings for the Kisii, who we found to be more 
educated than the Luhya. Our findings that the Luhya and Luo are below average in 
modern housing conditions are in line with Berg-Schlosser (1984), describing lack of 
modernization for the two tribes and high fertility rate for the Luhya, leading to poverty.   
  The differences between the tribes in economic performance indicators are of a 
large magnitude – mortality rate of 126 for every 1000 infants for the Luo, compared to 
35 out of 1000 for the Kikuyu, difference of a similar magnitude in the share of 
households with electricity/piped water/sewage, and significant differences in other 
variables as well. Again, our two leading variables are the modern housing variables. 
B. Values 
  The tribes in Kenya and the values of some of these tribes were researched before 
(see, for example, Berg-Schlosser, 1984), but not quantitatively and not consistently for a 
large set of tribes and a large set of values, which would enable analysis of the effect over 
economic performance. Since stories reflect the values of the society (Johns-Heine and 
Gerth, 1949, and Albrecht, 1956) and shape the values of the younger members of the 
society (Vitz, 1990, and Hakemulder, 2000), we have used children's stories to infer the 
values.  
  We interviewed respondents from each of the seven tribes (mostly by telephone), 
asking them to name and narrate popular children stories, ultimately collecting about 190 
popular stories. Each story was analyzed for 12 values (hard work, entrepreneurship, risk 
taking, collaboration, leading others, altruism, integrity, trust, responsibility to other 
group members, law obedience, just reward and justice/morality), with a score of -1 for 
opposing the value, 1 for some support, and 2 for a strong support. For each tribe, the 12 
values were constructed as the average over the score of each of its stories. See Appendix 
1 for a list of the questions used for scoring. In addition, we measured how many of the 
stories involve death or cruelty. 
  Out of the above mentioned values, three values were addressed in two or fewer 
stories for almost all the tribes. Thus, entrepreneurship,  leading others and 
justice/morality are neither supported nor opposed in the stories. While this may reflect 
on the economic performance of Kenya as a whole, it does not allow us to distinguish 
between tribes, and therefore these values were omitted from the analysis. More than 
40% of the stories involve death/cruelty, but with little variation; therefore, for a similar 
reason, we did not address it in the analysis.   
  We grouped similar values (collaboration and altruism as measuring cooperation 
within a group, integrity and trust since the first may lead to the second, and law 
obedience and just reward, which are related to one another), leading to the following 
results:
10 
Figure 3 here 
                                                  
10 Risk taking is addressed by only 3 stories for some of the tribes, the rest of the values are addressed by 5 
or more stories in each tribe.  
  Figure 3 shows differences between the tribes for each value, and differences 
between the average levels of various values. The Kalenjin stand out as collaborating, 
responsible to group members and law obeying.
11 The Kamba stand out as hard working. 
The Kikuyu show the highest level of risk taking and the lowest level of hard work, trust, 
responsibility to group members and law obedience.
12 The Kisii are avoiding risks and 
collaboration. The Luhya show a high level of collaboration.
13  
  Hard work and responsibility to others are generally supported. Law obedience is 
positive but very low. Collaboration is mixed. Risk-taking and integrity and trust are 
opposed in the stories, with trust itself gaining values of -1 to -0.7 for all the tribes. This 
extremely low level is in line with measuring trust using ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization, thus supporting our measurement methodology.  
  Responsibility to group members, the value addressed in section III, has an upper 
bound of 1.2 (for the Kalenjin and Kisii), relatively high level for the Kamba and Luhya 
(1.0 each), a level of 0.8 for the Luo, and lower levels for the Meru and Kikuyu (0.3 and 
0.1 respectively). It is addressed by 69 stories in the sample.  
C. Correlations 
  Table 2 presents the correlations between the economic performance indicators 
and each of the values from the previous sub-section (where the data includes the 
indicators and values for each of the tribes): 
                                                  
11 Our findings are in line with Berg-Schlosser, 1984, indicating that the Kalenjin’s conduct is governed by 
respect towards others, in particular family and elders, and that they trust one another but are suspicious 
toward strangers. 
12 This is broadly in line with Berg-Schlosser, 1984, describing the Kikuyu as having suspicious behavior 
toward others and among themselves, with trust confined to one's family and age-set, and as having a high 
number of thieves and robbers. Although Berg-Schlosser describes strong relations with other group 
members, this description appears for all the surveyed tribes, thus not allowing for comparison. 
13 Berg-Schlosser, 1984, indicates that the Luhya are generally regarded as friendly and peaceful, and are 
said to have strong feeling of kinship concerning their clans and sub-tribes.  
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  It should be mentioned that although the table presents correlations, causality can 
run in only one direction. The economic performance variables are from the last decade, 
while the stories on which the values are based are much older. Since the stories and 
values predate the economic indicators, causality can run from the values to economic 
performance, but economic performance is not causal to the values. 
  Our focus here and in the next sub-section is on responsibility to group members 
and its effect over economic performance, mainly through the modern housing indicators. 
Responsibility is positively correlated with mortality and negatively correlated with 
indices of economic performance (education, small family, external employment, and 
modern housing). Correlations with the modern housing indicators are -0.89 and -0.82. 
Thus,  responsibility to group members is strongly negatively correlated with current 
development, and negatively correlated with future development through both current 
development and education. Section III provided theoretical support for this effect. The 
next sub-section presents regression analysis for responsibility, while the rest of this sub-
section refers to the other values. 
 Hard  work is positively correlated with infant mortality and negatively correlated 
with the rest of the variables, i.e., negatively correlated with better economic 
performance. A possible interpretation is that hard work supports traditional agricultural 
work and manual labor, thus treating innovation as an unwelcomed short-cut. Risk taking, 
on the other hand, is negatively correlated with infant mortality and positively correlated 
with the rest of our indicators. Our interpretation is similar to the previous one – taking 
risks allows for abandoning the traditional way of living for a modern one, thus allows  
for modernization, better standards of living and better health care. Collaboration and 
integrity and trust are also positively correlated with mortality and overall negatively 
correlated with our education and development indices. Keeping in mind that the level of 
integrity and trust is very low (the values are opposed in the stories), a possible 
interpretation is that, in an environment of distrust, trusting or collaborating lead to an 
inferior result. This may also explain the overall negative correlation of law obedience 
with economic performance.  
D. Regression  Analysis 
  Based on the theory presented under section III, we continue with analysis of the 
effect of responsibility over economic performance indicators, using our two leading 
indicators (modern housing conditions): 
housing conditions =  0 α  +  × 1 α  responsibility + ε  
  Since we have only seven observations (one for each tribe) we must restrict our 
regressions to one explanatory variable. We are aware of the problems in using regression 
analysis with so few observations and regard the results as support for the theory, not 
proof. Table 3 describes the results: 
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  For the two regressions, the constant is positive and significant. The coefficient of 
responsibility for other group members is negative and significant in both regressions, 
such that every increase of 1 in the responsibility  level decreases the average of 
electricity/piped water/sewage by 13.38 percent points and the average of house roof by 
30.96 percent points. Thus, responsibility to others reduces modern housing conditions, 
therefore negatively affecting development of that group.   
  As mentioned before, causalities issues and endogeneity problems of values and 
economic indicators (see Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2006) are not present here. 
Values were measured using stories that are significantly older than the economic 
indicators, therefore responsibility can be causal to economic performance, but economic 
performance of the last decade cannot be causal to our measure of responsibility. The 
regressions, therefore, support the theory from section III. 
 
V. Conclusion 
  This research emphasizes the importance of the individual’s values to economic 
performance. We have presented a general model showing that values should be 
embedded into macroeconomic models, and provided an example for responsibility and 
care for other group members using a specific model. We showed that responsibility and 
care, although considered as a virtue, might slow or prevent development. Thus, a small 
difference in the values of two societies may translate over time into a large gap in their 
economic development. 
  A major contribution of this paper is suggesting a methodology for the 
measurement of values for economic research, overcoming both the problem in directly 
asking people about values and the problem of endogeneity between values and economic 
performance, by inferring them from already existing popular stories. We used it to 
measure and characterize values of the seven largest tribes in Kenya, analyzed the 
economic performance of these tribes with respect to the values, and showed that, indeed, 
responsibility and care for others might negatively affect economic development. Our  
seven tribe sample is small and therefore supports the theory and motivates further 
research of values, but it cannot serve as proof. 
  Differences in values call for different economic policies. Consider, for example, 
levying a tax and using it for a social safety net. If a country is underdeveloped due to 
responsibility and care as presented above, the safety net can replace the physical care, 
motivate individuals to migrate to the industrial sector, and improve the economic 
performance over time. However, if responsibility and care are not the reasons, the safety 
net is unhelpful, while the tax levied to finance it is harmful. Moreover, if the reason for 
underdevelopment is lack of entrepreneurship, for example, and the tax is progressive, 
i.e., levied on financially successful workers and entrepreneurs, it would deter 
entrepreneurship even more, and therefore would hurt economic development. Thus, 
development policy is not 'one size fits all' and should be tailored to each country based 
on its unique characteristics, including its values. 
  The macroeconomic literature avoided treating values for a long time, probably 
due to the abstract nature of this topic. However, we do believe that, after exploiting 
many other possible explanations for differences in economic performance with only 
partial success in improving economic performance in various locations, differences in 
norms and values should be explored as well. We hope our research will contribute to 
broader study of values and their effects, and eventually to understanding the origin of 
the differences in economic performance and the path for improving economic 
performance of less developed countries. Measuring a broad set of values in a large group 
of countries and using it in a cross-country regression seems like a promising next step.   
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Figure 1 - Evolvement of Wages and Employment in the Industrial Sector 
One Mass-Point Distribution 
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* 2 - strong support; 1 – some support; 0 – no support; -1 opposing the value. 
  
 
Table 1 – Economic Performance Indicators for Tribes in Kenya 
 
Tribe Districts  Infant 
Mortality 
Rate 





































Kalenjin  Baringo, Bomet, Buret, 
Keiyo, Kericho, Koibatek, 
Marakwet, Nandi, West 
Pokot, Uasin Gishu 
       53.0          51.1          32.5          33.5          11.0          58.7  
Kamba  Kitui, Machakos, Makueni, 
Mwingi 
       55.9          54.9          31.0          29.1            8.3          67.4  
Kikuyu Nyandarua,  Nyeri, 
Kirinyaga, Maragua, 
Murang'a, Thika, Kiambu 
       35.0          71.4          45.9          38.8          20.1          95.9  
Kisii Kisii  South  (Gucha), Kisii 
North (Nyamira), Kisii 
Central 
       61.2          58.0          27.9          21.5            4.4          69.8  
Luhya Bungoma,  Busia, 
Kakamega, Butere-Mumias, 
Vihiga, Lugari 
     104.9          54.6          33.4          24.1            5.7          57.3  
Luo  Bondo, Nyando, Rachuonyo, 
Siaya, Homa Bay, Migori, 
Kisumu 
     125.8          52.9          40.8          23.8            8.4          54.3  
Meru   Meru Central, Meru North 
(Nyambene), Nithi (Meru 
South) 
       46.1          50.6          37.9          24.5          19.8          88.4  
  
 














































Hard work  0.51 -0.79 -0.40 -0.45 -0.45 -0.67 
Risk taking  -0.19 0.47 0.69 0.84 0.50 0.21 
Collaboration + Altruism  0.33 -0.47 -0.29  0.08 -0.35 -0.65 
Integrity + Trust   0.33  -0.86  -0.48 -0.24 -0.38 -0.73 
Responsibility to group   0.32  -0.51 -0.86 -0.39  -0.89 -0.82 
Law obedience + Just reward  -0.13 -0.46 -0.65  -0.08 -0.36 -0.42 
* Correlations are for 7 observations (7 tribes). Numbers is bold are above 0.5 or below -0.5 .  
 
Table 3 – OLS Regression for Economic Performance and Responsibility* 
 
















Adjusted R square  0.75  0.60 
*  Numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the t-statistics. 
**   Significant at 2.5% level. 
***  Significant at 1% level. 
  
Appendix 1 
Value Identifying  Question* 
Hard work  Does the story advocate hard work?  
Or – just the opposite (the story advocates being lazy) 
Entrepreneurship  Does the story promote entrepreneurship, initiating new activities etc.?  
Or - just the opposite (the story discourages entrepreneurship and new initiatives). 
Risk taking  Does the story encourage taking risks?  
Or - just the opposite (the story encourages avoiding risks). 
Collaboration   Does the story promote collaboration with others?  
Or - just the opposite (the story promotes individualism and working on one's 
own). 
Leading others  Does the story encourage leading others?  
Or - just the opposite (the story encourages avoiding being a leader). 
Altruism  Does the story advocate good will, altruism, helping others without 
receiving immediate benefit or preferring someone else's needs over one's 
own?  
Or - just the opposite (the story advocates selfish behavior or discourages 
altruism).  
Integrity  Does the story promote integrity, telling the truth and being honest in 
dealing with others?  
Or - just the opposite (the story promotes lying and being dishonest). 
Trust  Does the story encourage trusting others?  
Or - just the opposite (the story encourages suspicious and careful behavior 
towards others). 
Responsibility 
to other group 
members 
Does the story promote being responsible and caring to other group 
members, or doing what others are expecting us to do?  
Or - just the opposite (the story promotes rebelling in one's community or 
society). 
Law obedience  Does the story encourage obeying the law and respecting the rules?  
Or - just the opposite (the story encourages cheating, stealing or other unlawful 
behavior, semi-illegal or illegal activities). 
Just reward  Does the story advocate just reward - reward for good deeds or 
punishment for bad deeds?  
Or - just the opposite (the story shows that bad deeds may get a reward while 
good deeds may bring upon a punishment). 
Justice\morality  Does the story encourage justice and being just and moral?  
Or - just the opposite (the story encourages unjust behavior).  
*Answers included yes-definitely, yes-somewhat, no, just the opposite or N\A. 
 